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INTRODUCTION

“The policemen or soldiers are only a gun in the establishment’s
hand. They make the racist secure in his racism. The gun . . . makes the
establishment secure in its exploitation. The first problem it seems is to
remove the gun . . . .“1 Arguably, this statement made by Huey Newton,
an African American political activist of the 1960s, sets the fifty-year-old
stage for the argument that my paper intends to make today—America is
at war with itself and the Constitution is a gun in its arsenal. Like a virus,
the strain of race relations in this country has lodged within this nation
such an aggressive attack to our cellular makeup—equal protection, due
process—that a threat to America’s “national security” has become an
everyday reality. U.S. judicial precedence, with Korematsu as one of the
cases at its contemporary helm, creates not only a basis of using race as
the motivation for antagonistic governmental action, but also sets the
framework for expanding the war powers of Article II to suit the political
conveniences of the newest “present emergency.”
I argue that as long as race or ethnicity functions as the means by
which the color line is demarcated in America, the United States will
forever be in a state of crisis. It will forever be shackled with a pressing
public necessity—a necessity warning of the danger to the country’s
public health and safety when the American legal system tells us that the
lives of some citizens matter more than the lives of others. Thus, the
government is always anticipating its next move, like a chess player
never losing sight of his need to entrap his opponent’s king, and its
citizens seem to always be a few moves behind.
The Constitution is the government’s gun, and national security is
one of its bullets. It is the Constitution—eloquently crafted, seemingly
indestructible—that is premised on the objective of protecting liberty and
unity. But the Constitution, like any manmade creation, is not without
flaw. Thus, “We the People,” the individuals that establish and sustain
this Constitution, are neither free nor unified. For if the rights of just one
person residing under the protection of this contractual document to
which he or she is assigned, are curbed, inhibited, restrained, or
infringed, then the nation is no longer liberated, no longer united, and no
longer secure. For it is the individual, “We the People,” by which and for
which the U.S. Constitution was established and to which the U.S.
Constitution must protect.

1

“HUEY NEWTON TALKS TO THE MOVEMENT ABOUT THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY,
CULTURAL NATIONALISM, SNCC, LIBERALS AND WHITE REVOLUTIONARIES,” THE BLACK
PANTHERS SPEAK 54 (Philip Sheldon Foner ed., Da Capo Press, 2nd ed. 2002). (emphasis
added)
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In this paper, I argue that the expansion of the government’s war
powers, the current state of U.S. affairs, and the historical jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court will continue to create a foundation by which
“national security” will justify the use of race or ethnicity as the primary
factor in arresting, detaining, or imprisoning members of a racial or
ethnic group. In Part I, I provide the particular facts of Korematsu and
the factual backdrop in which the case was decided. In Part II, I provide a
framing of the issues that Korematsu raises and the applicable level of
scrutiny that is used to decide similarly situated cases. In Part III, I
analyze how the government’s interest in national security has found its
footing in the history of our judicial system prior to the Korematsu
decision and how the Korematsu Court should have decided. In Part IV, I
discuss the contemporary issues that often arise by the current state of the
criminal justice system by reflecting on the history of American policing.
Finally, in Part V, I conclude with a discussion on the theoretical impact
of the Korematsu decision on the state of U.S. affairs in regards to race
relations and national security today.

II.

“FACTS DO NOT CEASE TO EXIST BECAUSE THEY ARE
IGNORED.”2

September 1, 1939 marked the start of World War II (WWII).3 Some
of the most notable causes of WWII consisted of Germany’s resentment
for signing the Treaty of Versailles, the devastation to the global
economy by the Great Depression, and the growing number of
dictatorships in European countries.4 But the infamy of WWII, the
infamy reigns in the event of the Holocaust—an event that led to the
genocide of a single racial group (the Jews) by an Aryan regime (the
Nazis). Although many governments—America included—may not have
agreed with such an overt persecution of the Jews, it can be argued that
the Nazis’ white nationalist mentality was one that was globally shared.
The U.S. joined the war two years later, following two attacks on
Pearl Harbor by Japanese fighter planes.5 In December 1941, Congress
declared war on Japan following the December 8th attack on Pearl
Harbor.6 Being fired from their government jobs and having their
2

ALDOUS HUXLEY, PROPER STUDIES 247 (1927).
World
War
II
Fast
Facts,
CNN
LIBRARY,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/09/world/world-war-ii-fast-facts/ (last updated July 31,
2015).
4
Id.
5
Library of Congress, EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066: EVACUATION AND SEGREGATION,
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/connections/manzanar/history2.html.
6
Id.
3
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cameras and short-wave radios confiscated were some of the
repercussions that Japanese Americans had felt in the weeks following
Congress’ declaration.7 From Japanese Americans in Hawaii being
accused by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts of helping the
Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor to newspapers reporting of JapaneseAmerican sabotage,8 America did not hide its resentment and distrust of
its Japanese citizens.
“At the time of the Pearl Harbor attacks, more than 100,000 persons
of Japanese ancestry were living in California, Arizona, and the coastal
areas of Oregon and Washington.”9 Most Japanese persons had come to
the U.S. as immigrants to work the mines, to help develop the railroad
system, and to be fishermen, farmers, and migrant agricultural laborers.10
While Japanese immigrants were initially accepted into the U.S. as a
means of cheap labor, Americans began to resent, mistrust, and
discriminate against Japanese immigrants over the years.11 With the
rising increase of Japanese immigration and the heightened stereotype of
the yellow peril, “the writings of various authors, newspaper editors,
columnists, and movies in which Asians were portrayed as sinister
villains engaged in activities of vengeance and treachery” became the
mirror by which Americans viewed those of Japanese ancestry.12
On February 19, 1942, before any Act of Congress was promulgated,
Executive Order No. 9066 authorized:
[T]he Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders
whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he
or any designated Commander deems such actions
necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such
places and of such extent as he or the appropriate
Military Commanders may determine, from which any
or all persons may be excluded, and with such respect to
which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or
leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the

7

Id.
Id.
9
Jay M. Brown, When Military Necessity Overrides Constitutional Guarantees: The
Treatment of Japanese Americans During World War II, YALE-NEW HAVEN TEACHERS
INSTITUTE (1982), http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1982/3/82.03.01.x.html.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
8
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Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander
may impose in his discretion.13
On March 21, 1942, Congress took action in support of President
Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 9066 and promulgated legislation that
provided that:
[W]hoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any
act in any military area or military zone prescribed,
under the authority of an Executive order of the
President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military
commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary
to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or
contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such
military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or
should have known of the existence and extent of the
restrictions or order and that his act was in violation
thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for
each offense.14
A curfew order promulgated pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066,
was attacked as unconstitutional in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). The curfew order “subjected all persons of Japanese
ancestry in prescribed West Coast military areas to remain in their
residences from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.”15 The appellant in Hirabayashi
contended that Congress’s 1942 Act was beyond the war powers of
Congress and that its application against only Japanese citizens
amounted to racial discrimination, which is constitutionally
impermissible.16 Despite these contentions, the Supreme Court “upheld
the curfew order as an exercise of the power of the government to take
steps necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage in an area threatened
by Japanese attack.”17
In May 1942, under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 and
the 1942 Act, an exclusion order—Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34—
was promulgated by the Commanding General of the Western Defense
13
Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407
(Feb. 25, 1942) (Executive Order No. 9066); see also Library of Congress, supra note 5.
14
Act of Congress of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173; Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
15
Id. at 217.
16
Id.
17
Id.
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Command.18 The order directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of
Japanese ancestry should be excluded from a described West Coast
military area.19 San Leandro, California, residence of Fred Korematsu,
was one of the military areas designated in the exclusion order.20
Korematsu was born on American soil. Thus, the Constitution makes him
a citizen of the United States “by nativity and a citizen of California by
residence.”21
Learning of the exclusion order, Korematsu chose to challenge it by
remaining in San Leandro and continuing his life as an American
citizen.22 At the advisement of his then Italian American girlfriend,
Korematsu underwent plastic surgery—altering his eyes in an attempt to
look less Japanese—and changed his name to Clyde Sarah.23 Despite
these alterations, Korematsu was recognized for being of Japanese
ancestry and was arrested on May 30, 1942 for violating the exclusion
order; and on September 8, 1942, he was convicted in a federal district
court.24 “No issue was raised as to Korematsu’s loyalty to the United
States.”25

III.

“ALL LEGAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH CURTAIL THE CIVIL
RIGHTS OF A SINGLE RACIAL GROUP ARE IMMEDIATELY
SUSPECT.”26

“I don’t want any of them [persons of Japanese ancestry] here. They
are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty . . .
The danger of the Japanese was, and is now—if they are permitted to
come back—espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he
is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does
not necessarily determine loyalty . . . But we must worry about the
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.”27

18

Id.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
20
Id. at 215-16.
21
Id. at 242-43 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
22
OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: THE FRED KOREMATSU STORY, PBS (2001).
23
Id.
24
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 236. Evidence of the Commanding General’s attitude toward individuals of
Japanese ancestry is revealed in his voluntary testimony on April 3, 1943, in San
Francisco before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas,
Part 3, pp. 739-40 (78th Cong,. 1st Sess.). (emphasis added)
19
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The material issue raised by Korematsu, was whether or not the
internment, in and of itself, was constitutional28—whether the forced
arrest, detainment, and imprisonment of a single racial group could
withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, the Korematsu Court chose
to frame the issue as whether it was beyond the war power of Congress
and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast war area at the time that they did.29 But a more brooding issue
dealing with race relations and national security is implicated by
Korematsu—”What does it mean to be an American?” In 1903, W.E.B.
Du Bois, an African American sociologist, introduced the concept of
double consciousness.30 Du Bois described double consciousness as the
division of one’s self and how that division prevents an individual from
truly forming a unified identity.31 Although Du Bois spoke of double
consciousness in the context of the Black American’s identity, it can be
argued that a double consciousness exists within any repressed and
devalued group in America. Accordingly, Korematsu illustrates the
double consciousness that manifested within the Japanese American
during WWII—the double consciousness of being both alien and citizen.
“When a fundamental right is limited by the government, courts
typically apply the highest level of scrutiny.”32 A law can only surpass
strict scrutiny if three prongs are satisfied. The first prong requires that
there must be a compelling state interest.33 The second prong requires
that narrowly tailored means be used to achieve the compelling state
interest.34 The third and final prong requires that “the government must
use the least restrictive means in limiting the people’s rights.”35
Laws classifying citizens by race are immediately suspect and are
subject to strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, not all suspect legislation is
unconstitutional.36 Thus, because a suspect law classifying persons by
28

OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: THE FRED KOREMATSU STORY, supra note 22.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
30
W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Brent Hayes Edwards ed., 2007)
(1903).
31
Id.
32
AMANDA DIPAOLO, ZONES OF TWILIGHT: WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND
FEDERAL COURT DECISION MAKING 3 (2010).
33
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a ‘compelling state interest.’”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1964)
(“Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court,
that a ‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’”).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
29
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race was at issue in Korematsu, strict scrutiny was the applicable level of
review in analyzing the constitutional validity of the legislation.

IV.

KOREMATSU IN CONTEXT: THE SHAPING OF LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY BY SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES OF
NATIONAL CRISIS
In 1896, at a time when America was endemic with racial prejudice
and discrimination, the highest court in the land set the legal precedent of
“separate but equal”—a precedent on which Korematsu would be
decided almost fifty years later. In Plessy v. Ferguson,37 the Supreme
Court upheld as constitutional a Louisiana statute that criminalized
railroad passengers for using facilities that were intended for a different
race. The majority reasoned that the statute was not unreasonable and
that the social badge of inferiority worn by the colored race is not one
which the Constitution can remove.38 In his dissent, Justice Harlan calls
for a colorblind constitution; one in which the interests of the two races
require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of
race hate to be planted under the sanction of the law. Despite Justice
Harlan’s position, the constitutionality of “separate but equal” remained
the legal framework upon which Korematsu was decided in 1944.
Notwithstanding the racial animus in America, upholding the
exclusion order in Korematsu can also be attributed to the Judiciary’s
expansive interpretation of the war powers in times of military necessity.
The Supreme Court has historically interpreted Presidential power in a
manner that generally expands it, not limits it.39 The case of Martin v.
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827), was the first case in which the
Supreme Court specifically described and defined the power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief.40 The Constitution, the Court
reasoned, invests the President with the exclusive power to determine
when the forces of the United States are to be activated during times of
invasion and civil rebellion.41 The Court held that Congress vests in the
President exclusive and sole discretion in making determinations of
emergencies and situations justifying the activation of the military.42
37

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
38
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
39
ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES OF NATIONAL
CRISIS, TERRORISM, AND WAR: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 41 (2011).
40
Id.
41
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827); see GARRISON, supra note 39 at
42.
42
Martin, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 31; see GARRISON, supra note 39 a 43.
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Safeguarding national security is most often synonymous with a war
on terror—a war that is often waged against a particular racial group. I
make the contention that a war on terror does not only have to be a war
between the U.S. and foreign nations; it can also be a war between the
U.S. and its own peoples. Arguably, the Mott Court supports my
contention with its endorsement of Executive emergency determinations
being made during times of international threat (invasion) as well as
during times of intra-national threat (civil rebellion). Under this rationale
and with the perception that citizenship ceases to matter for the “enemy
aliens” of nonwhite America, the U.S. is now and will always be in a
time of intra-national threat.
In regards to the development of pre-Korematsu public policy,
America’s intra-national war on terror can be traced throughout U.S.
history. In the 1880s, it was against Chinese immigrants when the
“yellow terror”—the belief that low-paid Chinese workers were taking
jobs away from whites—coincided with the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882.43 In the 1890s, it was against American Indians when the Dawes
Act attempted to erode tribal integrity and decertify Indian tribes, thus
making it easier for whites to acquire Indian land.44 In the 1920s, it was
against southern and eastern European immigrants when Congress—
influenced by the premises of eugenics—passed the Immigration Act of
1924 in an attempt to control the number of “unfit” individuals entering
the country and to strengthen the laws prohibiting race mixing.45 During
43

See ANTI-CHINESE LAWS AND THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR (American
Anthropological
Association
2007)
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/antichin_law_spanam_war.html. “When
President Rutherford B. Hayes signed the Chinese Exclusion Treaty in 1880, he
effectively reversed the open-door policy set in 1868, and placed strict limits on the
number of Chinese immigrants allowed into the U.S. as well as on the number allowed to
become naturalized citizens. Congress then enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882,
prohibiting for ten years both immigration from China and the naturalization of Chinese
immigrants already in the U.S.”
44
See Am. Anthropological Ass’n, U.S. CONTROL OF AMERICAN INDIANS (2007),
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/us_control.html (date when last visited
needed here). “In 1887, Congress passed the Dawes Severalty Act, which imposed a
system of private land ownership on Native American tribes for whom communal land
ownership had been a way of life. Individual Indians became eligible to receive land
allotments of up to 160 acres, together with U.S. citizenship. When the allotment system
finally ended, Indian landholdings were reduced from 138 million acres in 1887 to only
48 million acres by 1934.”
45
See Am. Anthropological Ass’n, EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION AND DEFINING WHITENESS
(2007)
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/eastern_southern_immigration.html (date
when last visited needed here).”Madison Grant and Charles Davenport, among other
eugenicists, were called in as expert advisers on the threat of “inferior stock” from
eastern and southern Europe, playing a critical role as Congress debated the Immigration
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the New Deal Era, it was against largely Blacks and Latinos when the
promulgation of legislation such as, the GI Bill of Rights and the Social
Security Act, created and maintained the wealth gap between whites and
non-whites, which is reflected in rates of home ownership, assets,
savings and investment even today.46
In regards to the development of pre-Korematsu legal policy
following Mott and specifically during the emergence of the Red Scare
in 1917,47 the Supreme Court continued to develop its jurisprudence of
deference to the government in times of national crises. The Red Scare
resulted in the Supreme Court establishing Constitutional boundaries of
the government’s power to regulate civil liberties, specifically those
involving political speech and dissent in times of war.48 In 1917,
Congress passed the Espionage Act, which made it unlawful to gather,
copy or otherwise secure military information for the purpose of
providing it to the enemy or otherwise using such information to the
detriment of the United States or the military.49
The Act was passed during a heightened time of national fear of
disloyalty, and its purpose was to gain support for America’s
involvement in World War I (WWI).50 The constitutionality of the
Act of 1924. The act attempted to control the number of ‘unfit’ individuals entering the
country by lowering the number of immigrants allowed in to fifteen percent of what it
had been previously.”
46
See Am. Anthropological Ass’n, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND WORLD WAR II
(2007) http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/great_depression_ww2.html (date
when last visited needed here).”The New Deal programs of the 1930s helped revive the
U.S. economy after the Great Depression. In 1935, the Social Security Act provided
retirement benefits for U.S. workers, but domestics and farm workers were initially
excluded from eligibility, a policy that largely affected blacks and Latinos. The GI Bill of
Rights or the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, which provided for college and
vocational education for returning World War II veterans as well as one-year of
unemployment compensation, resulted in an expansion of the middle class. The GI bill
also provided loans for returning veterans to buy homes and start businesses, but nonwhites were widely discriminated against in these programs.”
47
See PBS, PEOPLE & EVENTS: PRELUDE TO THE RED SCARE: THE ESPIONAGE AND
SEDITION
ACTS.
(2004),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/goldman/peopleevents/e_redscare.html. “America’s first
Red Scare, an era of hostility toward perceived “disloyalty”—and relentless government
repression of radicals and others—began in April 1919. The Red Scare’s roots extended
deep into the preceding years, almost to the day America entered World War I;
History.com, RED SCARE, A&E NETWORKS (2010), http://www.history.com/topics/coldwar/red-scare. As the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States
intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s, hysteria over the perceived threat posed by
Communists in the U.S. became known as the Red Scare. (Communists were often
referred to as “Reds” for their allegiance to the red Soviet flag.)”
48
GARRISON, supra note 39, at 91.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 93.
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Espionage Act of 1917, specifically section 3,51 was highly contested
within the Supreme Court by cases such as Shaffer52 (holding that, under
the Espionage Act, a conviction for the mailing of a book containing
several “treasonable, disloyal, and seditious utterances” was valid),
Schenck53 (holding that an anti-conscription circular with the intent to
obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service violated the Espionage
Act), and Debs54 (holding that a Socialist Party speech with the purpose,
incidental or not, of opposing the war was not constitutionally protected).
Thus, this First Amendment jurisprudence continued to advance the
concept that when civil liberties are limited during national emergencies,
the Judiciary, more often than not, will defer to the political branches of
government when they are working together.55 Cases concerning war
powers become questions of procedure rather than substance.56 This
approach to wartime judicial decision-making offers less protection to
individuals because the approach allows the Court to neglect the
constitutional question presented before it.57 With the emergence of
WWII, the Supreme Court officially cemented the legal authority to
legitimize the subjugation of individual rights by government action with
its decision in Korematsu v. United States.58

51
The Espionage Act (1917), c. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219; see also Digital
History, THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917, Digital History ID 1904 (2014)
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3904.
“The
Espionage Act of 1917, § 3, provides that: ‘Whoever, when the United States is at war,
shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere
with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to
promote the success of its enemies and whoever when the United States is at war, shall
willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in
the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting
or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United
States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, or both.’”
52
Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th Cir. 1919).
53
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
54
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
55
DIPAOLO, supra note 32, at 2.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 4.
58
GARRISON, supra note 39, at 201. “The other two internment cases—Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.A. 283 (1944)—
addressed two issues arising before and after the exclusion order challenged in
Korematsu. In Hirabayashi, a curfew order was at issue and in Endo, a retention/detention
order was at issue. In both Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court held that the President
had the power to authorize a policy of curfew and exclusion followed by detention in
time of war. However, the Court held in Endo that the internment of loyal Japanese
Americans could not be supported by the fact that proposed relocation communities
refused to accept the released Japanese Americans.” Id.
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The anti-civil liberties ruling made in Korematsu not only sheds light
on the power of the “Jim Crow” era in which the Justices of the Supreme
Court sat, but also on the danger to individual rights caused by national
security interests. In light of the racial antagonism implications and the
national security interests surrounding Korematsu, the Supreme Court
failed to apply the proper judicial standard.59 Although the Supreme
Court purported to apply strict scrutiny, the Court instead applied the
minimal standard of rational basis review—whereby a law is upheld if it
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.60 Accordingly, if the
Supreme Court had properly applied strict scrutiny, then it should have
found Executive Order No. 9066 and the 1942 Act to be unconstitutional.
As aforementioned in Part II, for a law to pass under strict scrutiny,
the government must be advancing a compelling state interest, and the
means by which the interest is to be achieved must be narrowly tailored
and least restrictive in limiting individual rights.61 In Korematsu, national
security was determined to be a necessary and crucial government
objective, and thus the “compelling interest” prong was met. Justice
Black, former member of the Ku Klux Klan,62 reasoned that the military
authorities’ apprehension of grave, imminent danger to the public safety
justified a compelling interest.63 Arguably, Justice Black fails to address
the “narrowly tailored” and “least restrictive” prongs of the strict scrutiny
analysis. However, some may reason that Justice Black’s remark that
“the exclusion order had a definite and close relationship to the
prevention of espionage and sabotage”64 was his attempt at meeting the
“narrowly tailored” and “least restrictive” prongs of the test. I disagree.
In order to meet the “narrowly tailored” and “least restrictive”
prongs under strict scrutiny, (1) the law should not be under/overinclusive and (2) there cannot be a less restrictive alternative to achieve
the same interest.65 The exclusion order was neither “narrowly tailored”
59
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(in that it was over-inclusive in reaching more people, non-citizens and
citizens of Japanese ancestry, than was necessary) nor “least restrictive”
(in that a less restrictive means of individual determination of disloyalty
was available to achieve the government’s interest). By upholding the
enforcement of the exclusion order merely on the reasoning of
Hirabayashi, the Court abandons its duty to apply strict scrutiny.66 It is
evident that the wholesale removal of a single racial group is overly
broad and thus unconstitutional.67 Therefore, the true error of the Court
was in failing American citizens at an important time and at an important
juncture by applying a weak judicial standard in the protection of
Constitutional rights.68
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling, Korematsu has been widely and
severely criticized on the premise that it dodges a more serious,
underlying, constitutional question in its upholding of a race-specific
statute disadvantaging a racial minority.69 In 1984, a federal district court
overturned Korematsu’s conviction on the ground that the government
had “knowingly withheld information from the courts when they were
considering the critical question of military necessity.”70 Four years later,
Congress enacted legislation acknowledging the “fundamental injustice”
of the evacuation and providing restitution to individuals that were
forced to leave their homes.71 Although the Korematsu decision has not
been overruled, it is not remembered for its holding but arguably for
setting the precedence that statutes that are facially discriminate against
racial minorities are constitutionally troubling and must be challenged.72

V.
KOREMATSU SETS THE STAGE FOR THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S INTRA-NATIONAL WAR ON TERROR
The structure of the American criminal justice system has always
been in controversy. One particular issue with the system is the
government’s use of preventive detention. Thus, an issue that may be
framed is whether it is beyond the government’s power to use preventive
techniques to maintain social control and to ensure the security of its
citizens. But a more brooding issue dealing with the criminal justice
system and how it allocates criminal liability to its citizens is whether
some of us are born a suspect? It was President Johnson who called for a
66
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“War on Crime,” who saw the urban policeman as the “frontline soldier.”
Despite the unconstitutionality of ordinances that criminalize status
instead of conduct, revamped and revitalized laws take their places . . .
hoping that this time they will be able to withstand judicial scrutiny.
Fifty years later, and the crime is still the same . . . most often, it is to be
black . . . to be black with other blacks . . . to be black and wear the same
colors . . . to be black in a designated area. The crime is one of status . . .
of identity . . . it is to be a mere member of a people . . . it is to be born a
suspect.
“Contemporary detention jurisprudence has developed across several
contexts including pretrial detention, commitment of the mentally ill, and
detention of sexual predators, undesirable aliens, and unlawful
combatants.”73 Instead of being seen as a form of punishment,
contemporary detention is seen as regulatory. When we call a crime by
another name does it make it less egregious? What about the laws that
are in place that defend these status crimes? What is required of a statute
in order for it to “punish” or “regulate” the action or inaction of a
citizen? How does the government use national security to maintain the
use of a constitutionally bankrupt system?
The use of preventive detention puts the traditional guarantees of
criminal justice at risk. Where the concern is with prevention and not
punishment, the important assessment consists in an inquiry into an
individual’s personality rather than into the criminal act. The less
relevant the criminal act is for the judicial decision, the less effective the
traditional safeguards.74 Thus, it appears that preventive detention passes
judicial review and most importantly constitutional muster because it
falls under the guise of regulation rather than punishment. It can be
argued that “a statute is in excess of the power vested in the Legislature
[when] it makes a mere intention, unexecuted, and not connected with
any overt act, a crime.”75 For a law to subject individuals to just
punishment it must be for some past voluntary wrongful or potentially
harmful conduct specified in advance by statute.76
Although the purposes of criminal punishment are the subject of
controversy, there is the consensus that desert is a necessary condition
for punishment.77 If punishment is premised on “the requirement of an
73
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act,” then people cannot be punished for falling into some demographic
category that is statistically likely to commit crime or for exhibiting
some condition which tends to be a predictor of future crime.78
Therefore, individuals cannot and should not be punished for their status.
And yet, so many slain black and brown bodies litter the streets of this
country. What is their crime? The crime often tends to be who they are
and not what they did.
When the assessment consists of an inquiry into an individual’s
personality rather than into the criminal act, the assessment seems to
dictate the occurrence of a status crime. An individual’s personality
expounds on one’s characteristics, thought patterns, and ideals. To assess
someone’s personality in determining whether or not they will be
“detained” and whether or not their constitutional rights will be
diminished is to punish someone for their status. For example, Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), analyzes the “double track” system in
which the offender is subjected first to a period of retributive detention,
or punishment, and then to a period of preventive detention.79 In
Hendricks, Justice Thomas reasoned that the “liberty interest is not
absolute” and that the Kansas statutory requirements limited indefinite
confinement to those with “volitional impairment[s],” making it
“difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous
behavior.”80 The Supreme Court upheld the Kansas “double track”
sexual predator statute as constitutional.
In the United States, punishment is only punishment if it is
retributive, and while many crimes are intended to be both punitive and
preventive, there are clear cases in which the intent (at least the explicit
intent) is preventive and not punitive.81 Detention becomes a reaction to
what a person is (i.e., status) rather than what he or she actually did (i.e.,
conduct).82 The problem is that detention, whatever its aim, is always an
impediment on the individual’s right to liberty and due process of the
law.
In addition to the affect that preventive detention has on certain
members of society (specifically, minorities), criminal law reform is also
a subject that is addressed. One particular subset of criminal law reform
is the reforming of police practices. When searching for effective
alternatives to the way that police practices are implemented currently, it
is crucial that the history of these practices is explored in order to guide
78
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the community in effectively brainstorming new strategies. The most
heavily discussed issue deals with America’s policing of low-income
communities and communities of people of color. What has led to so
many young black and brown children being gunned down by the same
law enforcement officers who have pledged to serve and protect them?
The development of police practices in the United States began with
the use of slave patrols and Night Watches, which later became the
model by which modern police departments have functioned.83 The slave
patrols and the Night Watches were designed to control the behaviors of
minorities.84 Even before the first formal slave patrol was created in the
Carolina Colonies in 1704, the South continuously used the practices of
patrols and Night Watches to capture runaway slaves and return them to
their slave masters.85 After the Civil War, state law enforcement officers
would work with vigilante groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan—”which
notoriously assaulted and lynched Black men for transgressions that
would not be considered crimes at all, had a White man committed
them”—to run and manage the slave patrols.86
In the late nineteenth century, the rise of the new working class and
the frequent occurrence of major strikes and riots in American cities like
Chicago resulted in municipalities hiring armed men to impose order.87
In each of the major strikes and riots, the police attacked strikers with
extreme violence.88 This ideology of order that developed in the late
nineteenth century echoes down to today—except that today, poor black
and Latino people are the main threat, rather than immigrant workers.89
What, if anything, has changed since the eighteenth century development
of the slave patrols from the current police practices today? And how has
it impacted the way America deals with its national security, especially
with intra-national threats?
There is arguably no change from the way America was policed over
three centuries ago to the way that it is policed today. In present day, the
most marginalized of society, especially black and brown people, have
been targeted by police officers through strategies, such as stop-and-frisk
83
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tactics, racial profiling, selective enforcement policing, and abuse of
searches and seizures. The way this ideology of American policing has
developed through history can be viewed most dramatically in the
militarization of law enforcement officers. The use of military-style
equipment—weapons and tactics designed for the battlefield—to conduct
ordinary law enforcement activities—are used by the police routinely,
across the United States, to force their way into people’s homes,
disrupting lives and destroying communities.90 In a study conducted by
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), the ACLU found that the
use of paramilitary weapons and tactics primarily impacted people of
color. For instance, when paramilitary tactics were used in drug
searches, the primary targets were people of color, whereas when
paramilitary tactics were used in hostage or barricade scenarios, the
primary targets were white.91
When looking at the way history has shaped present day police
practices, it is crucial to look at the issue of national security and
American policing of people of color in a critical and analytical context.
It is more than the growing number of young black bodies sprawled
across the American streets. Bodies bloodied, bruised, and breathless. In
the wake of their death, the community must recognize the issues that
their passing brings to light. It is recognizing that these young lives have
been stunted by the criminal justice system . . . by a creature of
government that should be held accountable for failing the communities
it serves. It is recognizing that issues such as digital illiteracy, unequal
access to educational resources, and inability to receive optimal
healthcare, have been deliberately redlined, redistricted, or rescreened to
create clear lines of non-access to low-income communities (often
predominantly communities of people of color). Taking this particular
90
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viewpoint on the broad issue of national security is crucial to the future
development of America’s safekeeping.

VI.
RACE RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY TODAY: THE
LEGAL MURDER OF YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE IMPLICATION OF
FERGUSON
Marcus Tullius Cicero, a Roman philosopher and political theorist, is
often quoted for his statement inter arma silent leges: in war, the law is
silent.92 Public policy in post-Korematsu America did not see much
positive change in the realm of national security and race relations.
America’s intra-national war on terror raged on, and is arguably still
raging.
In the 1950s, it was against Mexicans when “Operation Wetback, a
project of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, deported
hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants from the Southwest.93 In the
1960s and 1970s, it was against non-whites, with the most substantial
impact on Blacks, when affirmative action became synonymous with
“reverse discrimination” as whites began to resent opportunities afforded
nonwhites and U.S. courts began to strike down affirmative action
programs.94 In the 1990s and early 2000s (post-9/11), it was against
92
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“foreigners”—undocumented immigrants, illegal residents, and
Muslims—when legislation such as, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the 1996 Welfare Reform bill, and the Patriot Act,
were designed to thwart terrorism and the social advancement of
immigrants.95
But what about today? Which group in the U.S. is now the
government’s most evident opponent in its war on terror? Today, the
war, a war that has been waged for over four hundred years, is against
America’s Black males—Emmett Till, Medgar Evers, Amadou Diallo,
Trayvon Martin, Jordan Davis, Michael Brown—when their
advancement in society is thwarted by an institutional racism that is often
dismissed by the U.S. legal system. “The practice of demonizing African
Americans dates back to the period of the slave trade and has endured
despite the reelection of America’s first African American president.”96
The not guilty verdict rendered in the George Zimmerman trial97 and the
St. Louis County grand jury’s decision not to indict Darren Wilson98 are
the latest in a long line of reminders that far too many whites believe that
blacks, in general, and black males, in particular, are dangerous, thus
making young black men the faces of crime in contemporary America.99
Because the Black body is viewed as a site of “pathology,”
specifically criminal pathology, Black male bodies are ontologically
truncated and stymied through racist gazes as if they are “guilty of
95

See GOVERNMENT: 1990s-2000s, NAFTA, THE PATRIOT ACT, AND THE NEW
IMMIGRATION
BACKLASH,
THE
RACE
PROJECT
(2007),
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/nafta.html. “In 1992, Congress passed the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) intended to create a free-trade bloc
among the U.S., Canada and Mexico. However, the agreement raised concerns in the U.S.
about immigration from south of the border. The 1996 Welfare Reform bill included antiimmigrant and other measures that eliminated many social services for undocumented
immigrants. In 2001, the U.S. government initiated a series of immigration policies under
the Patriot Act that were designed to thwart terrorism after the 9/11 attacks.”
96

Owen Brown, Jr., The Legal Murder of Trayvon Martin and New York City Stopand-Frisk Law: America’s War Against Black Males Rages On, 37 WESTERN J. OF BLACK
STUDIES 258, 258 (2013).
97
See id. at 260. “On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman a white male of
Hispanic descent, shot and killed a teenage black male named Trayvon Martin.
Zimmerman was acting in the capacity of a neighborhood Watch Captain for a gated
community in Sanford, Florida. On July 13, 2013, a jury consisting of six women
acquitted Zimmerman of the charge of second degree murder or the lesser charge of
manslaughter.” Id.
98
A St. Louis County grand jury—consisting of nine whites and three blacks—decided
not to indict local police officer, Darren Wilson, for the fatal shooting of unarmed black
teen, Michael Brown in August of 2014. See Storyline: Michael Brown Shooting, NBC
NEWS (2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting.
99
Brown, Jr., supra note 96, at 260.

126 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:107

something—some previous crime or sin or moral slippage.”100 America’s
young black males—the Trayvon Martins and the Michael Browns that
reside within and outside of the inner cities—are not the problem.
“Rather the problem is that Blackness is pre-marked and pre-nominated
as a site of ‘deviance’ vis-à-vis white racist epistemic and axiological
frames of reference.”101 State or state-sanctioned violence on the Black
body is “the failure to see Black Americans as unique individuals with
promise, talents, resources, or even genius that one day might improve
the republic.”102
Thus, America’s war against black males rages on,103 and the Black
American’s defeats—such as, the de-emasculation of Black males during
slavery, the persistent police brutality against people of color coinciding
with the over- and under-policing of lower income communities, and the
growing wealth gap between whites and nonwhites that is continually
solidified by striking down affirmative action programs—outweigh its
victories—such as, the Brown104 decision, the 1964 Civil Rights Act,105
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.106 The contemporary reality of the
relationship between Black Americans and the criminal (in)justice
system107 is evidence of my claim that national security has justified the
use of race or ethnicity as the primary factor in arresting, detaining, or
imprisoning members of a racial or ethnic group in America.
Even though Blacks only make up thirteen percent of the nation’s
population, they comprise forty percent of its prison inmates.108 “Sadly,
members of law enforcement, judges, and jurors find it difficult to
empathize with Black defendants and usually believe that members of
this group ‘get what they deserve.’”109 The New York City Stop-andFrisk program can be used as one of the most recent examples to further
expound on the tenuous relationship between Black Americans and the
criminal justice system. Championed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and
Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, the rules governing the program
100
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are delineated in New York State Criminal Procedure Law § 140.50,
which are based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).110 “Opponents of stop-and-frisk argue that it creates
antagonism between law enforcement and the people in the communities
they are charged with policing.”111 Not only are Blacks and Hispanics
disproportionately targeted by the program,112 but empirical findings of
the NYCLU, the Center on Constitutional Rights reveal that blacks are
policed, arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced more harshly than whites in
the American criminal justice system.113
In the wake of this ongoing intra-national war on Black males
(arguably in the name of “national security”), America is left with the
visual imageries of state sanctioned violence—of a brutally disfigured
Black face, one beyond his mother’s recognition, lying motionless in a
casket; of Black blood splattered across “Jim Crow Must Go” t-shirts in
the driveway of a man’s home; of a night being riddled with 41 gun shots
from a policeman’s firearm, followed by the streets enveloping yet
another black body; of little Black boys adorned in hoodied sweatshirts
being racially profiled in gated communities; of a car bursting with the
melodies of hip hop and brown faces being barreled with bullet holes;
and of police officers donned in full-fledge riot gear juxtaposed to the
faces of mostly Black women, men, and children. In order to put an end
to these historical wars on terror and to the never-ending state of
emergency which is this nation’s reality, we must remove the gun—we
must put the civil rights and the civil liberties of American citizens, and
even of those who reside on U.S. soil, over the American government’s
continuous expansion of power during times of pressing public necessity.
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